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Abstract 
The Internet and social media have opened niches for political exploitation of human 
dispositions to hyper-alarmed states that amplify perceived threats relative to their objective 
probabilities of occurrence. Researchers should aim to observe the dynamic “ramping up” of 
security threat mechanisms under controlled experimental conditions. Such research 
necessarily begins from a clear model of standard baseline states, and should involve adding 
treatments to established experimental protocols developed by experimental economists. We 
review these protocols, which allow for joint estimation of risk preferences and subjective 
beliefs about probabilities and their distributions. Results we have obtained on such 
estimates, from populations in various countries, are gathered for comparison. Most people 
show moderate risk aversion in non-alarmed states. We also find universal heterogeneity in 
risk preference structures, with substantial sub-samples weighting probabilities in such a way 
	 2	
as to display “probability pessimism” (rank dependent utility), while others make risky 
choices in accordance with expected utility theory. 
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A currently salient focus of challenges to governance models stems from 
opportunistic political exploitation of evolved human threat-response systems. Woody and 
Szechtman [2016, this volume] argue persuasively that new social media facilitate this 
exploitation, and lead to widespread perception of risk that bears little relationship to 
objective dangers, particularly to dangers that lie within the plausible control of the hyper-
alarmed individuals. In this context it is useful to review what is known about the 
relationship between objective risks and subjective risk attitudes in people’s non-alarmed, or 
“resting,” states. An obvious avenue for future experimental research is to observe the 
dynamic “ramping up” of security threat mechanisms under controlled conditions. Such 
research necessarily begins from a clear model of standard baseline states. Furthermore, such 
work will be most informative to the extent that it adds new treatments to the experimental 
protocols that have been used for probing the baseline relationships between subjective and 
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objective risk. The primary disciplinary site of this protocol development has been 
experimental economics.1 
Most decisions made by humans and other animals involve risk or uncertainty. In a 
typical situation of choice, which available alternative response is optimal for a decision 
maker (DM), in terms of either organismal fitness or individual utility, is conditional on 
which member of a set of possible states of the world obtains, where the probability of each 
state in the set is neither 0 nor 1.  Choices by DMs under such circumstances can be 
interpreted as expressing either virtually or literally computed subjective estimates of the relevant 
probabilities, multiplied by the relative costs and benefits to the DM associated with each 
possible decision outcome. Following standard terminology, a choice is said to involve risk 
when the information that is required to accurately estimate relevant objective probabilities, 
given the computational resources available to the DM, is available in principle, regardless of 
whether it is actually harvested or used by the DM. If some such information is not available 
then the choice is said to involve uncertainty.2 
Consider an example. A subordinate male social animal faces a choice between 
attempting to mate, or not, with a specific female on a particular occasion. Suppose that if 
this attempt is observed by a dominant male, punishment will result. For simplicity, suppose 
that observed mating attempts by subordinates are always punished, i.e., that the probability 
of punishment given observation of a mating attempt is 1. If probability of observation 
varies with circumstances, then whether it is optimal for the subordinate to make a specific 
attempt depends on multiplying this probability by the expected payoffs to the subordinate 
																																																								
1	For a survey of pre-experimental background theory in economics, see Gollier [2001].	
2	A further distinction is often drawn between situations in which objective probabilities could be calculated 
given more information, and situations in which alternative states are insufficiently specified for their 
probabilities to be calculated even given full information. Choices in conditions of the latter type are said to 
involve ambiguity. We will set this distinction aside for present purposes.	
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associated with, respectively, successful and unsuccessful mating attempts. The payoffs in 
question may be positive or negative with respect to any particular ex ante reference point. At 
the most general level of scientific abstraction, payoffs can be represented as changes in 
relative expected fitness coefficients. In the case of an organism that can pursue idiosyncratic 
interests that diverge from expected fitness, costs and benefits may instead be measured in 
terms of ordinal or cardinal expected utility (von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944]; Savage 
[1954]). In the example, expected utility from successful mating, from spurned mating 
attempts, and from hostile response by a dominant observer would incorporate material, 
social, and psychological rewards and punishments. Choice options characterized in terms of 
expected payoffs are referred to as prospects. 
Humans had some ancestors that lacked the cognitive resources to explicitly 
compute probabilities associated with risky and uncertain choices. That the genes of these 
ancestral lines persisted is sufficient evidence for the proposition that they had evolved 
dispositions to respond differentially to varying objective probabilities.3 These dispositions 
would have accurately optimized expected payoffs only in conditions that occurred with 
sufficient past frequency to have been tracked by adaptive selection, and that were 
distinguishable by the ancestors’ perceptual sensitivities. Since this implies common gaps 
between ideal and actual conditions, cognitively unsophisticated human ancestral DMs 
sometimes made choices that involved error, in the sense that a stochastically dominated 
prospect4 was chosen. Following standard reasoning in evolutionary psychology, we assume 
that traces of these evolved dispositions remain present in cognitively normal human adults 
																																																								
3	Some of these would have been dispositions for conditioned learning of recurrent contingencies. 
4 An option of type O stochastically dominates an option of type O’ if and only if the statistically expected 
payoff of an instance of O is greater than the statistically expected payoff of an instance of O’. This allows for 
occasions when the realized payoff from a specific instance of O’ is higher than that of the alternative O-type 
option.	
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and children, where they manifest as biases, that is, as tendencies to make certain kinds of 
errors more than other kinds of errors. 
This standard reasoning is silent on an important, general, empirical question. Did 
natural selection produce a standard set of biases common in all cognitively normal people, 
or a polymorphism of biases? Formulating possible answers to this question requires 
recognition of the complex structure of risky and uncertain choices. Biases might be identified 
at any or all of several levels of choice problem specification, of which three have received 
special emphasis in economics: 
(1) Risk preferences: Does a person have  acertainty equivalent (CE) for a prospect 
that is greater than, equal to, or less than the expected payoff of the 
prospect? A CE is the non-risky payoff, or “sure thing,” that is equivalent, 
for the DM, to the risky prospect. A DM with a CE that is less (greater) 
than the expected payoff is said to be risk averse (loving) with respect to 
that prospect context in question. aA DM is risk neutral in the prospect 
context if she has a CE that is equivalent to the risky expected payoff. 
(2) Subjective belief priors: Does a person subjectively represent probability 
distributions of risky prospects in ways that systematically depart from, 
but co-vary with, objective probability distributions? A DM that tends to 
either over-weight or under-weight probabilities depending on where 
they lie in objective probability distributions is said to probability weight, 
and is characterized as having rank-dependent attitudes to risk in the 
relevant prospect context (Quiggin [1982]).  
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(3) Reference point sensitivity: Do people try to avoid what they perceive as 
“backward5” changes in utility wealth per se? A DM that varies risk 
preferences and/or subjective belief priors systematically with respect to 
a reference point that separates prospects into classes subjectively framed as 
“gains” or “losses,” where prospects falling on the “loss” side of the 
reference point are weighted more heavily than prospects on the “gain” 
side of the reference point, is said to be loss averse.  
Experimental economists gather data on these and other dimensions of variation in choice 
under uncertainty among people (and other animals; see Kagel, Battalio and Green [2007]) 
by presenting subjects with choices among prospects, typically but not exclusively as 
“lotteries” over monetary rewards, that are designed in such a way is to elicit patterns in data 
that can be estimated using a range of formal theories. Expected utility theory (EUT) (Savage 
[1954]; Binmore [2009]) describes choices that would be made by a probability un-biased 
prospect optimizer. Choices made by DMs with rank-dependent, probability weighted 
preferences can be characterized by a family of models descended from Quiggin [1982] that 
are collectively referred to as rank dependent utility theory (RDU). Choices reflecting loss 
aversion dependent on a subjective reference point, which also incorporate rank-dependence, 
are currently modeled using cumulative prospect theory (CPT), due to Tversky and Kahneman 
[1992]. It is unfortunately common to find behavioral scientists who are not economists, 
along with some careless economists, assuming that people in general manifest the biases 
identified by CPT. It casts no aspersion on the importance of CPT as one item in the 
																																																								
5	This refers to a folk intuition, not directly built into the axioms of any formal choice theory, that people try to 
avoid situations in which they have less wealth, including less utility wealth, tomorrow than they have today.		
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theorist’s toolbox to point out that this assumption is empirically unsupported (Harrison and 
Swarthout [2016]). 
 EUT, RDU, and CPT structurally identify processes, or classes of processes, that 
generate observable choice data. The processes in question are sometimes literally computed, 
either by algorithms implemented in neural circuitry or by people using external devices that 
record and compile operational steps. But more often they are “virtual” in the sense 
associated with Dennett’s [1987] intentional stance. That is, a formally characterized decision 
making process typically denotes an equivalence class of relationships between prospect 
contexts and observed choices in which operations distinguished in the theorist’s analysis do 
not necessarily represent discrete operations performed by the DM, but might rather 
represent elements of the economic, social, or biological problem as characterized by an 
analyst modeling its solution. To the extent that parallel distributed processing or 
“connectionist” models of decision making approximate the dynamics of neural processing, 
the virtual-process interpretation may be the standard default one (Clark [1989]) for 
decisions processed by a “raw brain” functioning on its own. On the other hand, humans 
make many of their risky decisions in social contexts where they use one another as sources 
of imitation and consultation, and where they furthermore have recourse to many kinds of 
institutional “scaffolding” such as actuarial tables, investment guides, books, the internet, etc. 
(Hutchins [1995], Clark [1997]). In such cases literal-process interpretations are more 
plausible, though still require special direct evidence regarding implementation mechanisms. 
 Recent experimental economic research has established an important, general fact 
for evolutionary psychologists to investigate and model. This is that human risky decision 
making involves structurally specifiable, predictable heterogeneity across individuals, across choice domains, 
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and across decision environments. That is, it is neither characterized by uniform biases that affect all 
people in all choice contexts, nor is it chaotic and unpredictable. This has immediate 
implications for policy design and governance. A policy or set of institutionally constructed 
incentives that guides some part of a randomly selected human population toward one risky 
choice tendency will produce predictably divergent effects in other parts of such a 
population. Economists in their role as policy advisors are directly engaged with these effects. 
As part of the project of studying hyper-alarmed security threat systems, evolutionary 
psychologists should also study the biological and cultural origins of the multi-faceted 
heterogeneity discovered by economists, which may be expected to shed light on the extent 
of the system’s adaptability and plasticity. 
 Section 2 reviews the dimensions along which heterogeneity in human risk responses 
has been revealed through economic experimentation. Section 3 presents the family of basic 
theories that are used to represent a specific, but fundamental, aspect of this heterogeneity, 
namely variation with respect to the structure of risk preferences. Observations of the 
relative frequencies of these varying structural types, derived from our experimental work, 
are then summarized in tabular form. This is the first time this suite of studies have been 
presented together so as to reveal recurrent patterns across different study populations. In 
Section 4 we turn to the theory and evidence behind a second source of heterogeneity, 
variation in subjective beliefs about probabilities. Section 4 concludes with some reflections 
on the significance of the reported observations for anticipated future research by 
psychologists and others, including economists who can supply complementary formal 
theory and econometric estimation tools, on the vulnerabilities that, under some 
circumstances, render people prone to being roused into states of hyper-alarm about abstract 
threats that is out of proportion to objective risk. 
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2. Dimensions of Heterogeneity 
 Economists are interested in heterogeneous response to risk and uncertainty for 
more than just general theoretical and descriptive purposes. They also must contend with it 
for practical purposes. For example, should women in a specific sample be predicted to 
display more risk aversion than men in that sample? Policy alternatives on which economists 
are asked to offer advice are often tested by being administered as randomized treatments in 
experiments. However, in light of heterogeneity, randomization to treatment is often 
insufficient to ensure the absence of confounding differences in samples. Heterogeneity of 
subject response directs attention to causal mechanisms generating it, which might interact 
with the treatment. This in turn implies attention to structural features of models, and 
complicates the statistical issues around randomized evaluation; see Heckman [1992], Keane 
[2010a], [2010b], and Leamer [2010]. The very point of worrying about sample selection is 
recognition of the possibility of effects of heterogeneity, so an experimenter cannot be 
casual about controlling for it. The matter is particularly acute when selection is on risk 
attitudes of treated and untreated subjects, so-called “randomization bias” (Harrison, Lau 
and Rutström [2009]; Harrison and Lau [2014]). 
 Heterogeneity is subtle. It can refer to differences across individuals at a point in 
time, conditional on a model of decision-making. It can refer to differences over time for the 
same individual and model of decision-making. It can refer to differences in the model of 
decision-making for an individual. And it can refer to differences in the behavior of the same 
individual across domains (e.g., choices over financial risks and choices over health risks). 
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 A. Heterogeneity Across Individuals for a Given Model 
 There are three broad approaches to allowing for individual heterogeneity in 
experimental choice data. 
 The first is to collect enough observations from each subject to be able to directly 
estimate models for that individual. Hey and Orme [1994] remains a leading exemplar of this 
approach, which has become more popular in recent applications. A main practical limitation 
to this method is that as one adds experimental treatments to test hypothesized special 
effects, power may quickly be compromised given limited experimental resources. 
 The second approach is to collect a standard list of observable demographic 
characteristics from each individual, pool the responses across all subjects, and condition 
estimation of parameters on the observed characteristics. Thus one might estimate a model 
in which a risk aversion parameter is a linear function of sex, age, race, income, and so forth. 
In this case one obtains estimates of the coefficients of the effect of each of the 
characteristic on the parameter, as well as a constant term (e.g., Harrison, Lau and Rutström 
[2007]). The danger with this approach is that there may be some characteristic of individuals 
that is not observed by the experimenter and that systematically affects responses: this is the 
so-called “unobserved individual heterogeneity” problem.6 
 The third approach to allowing for individual heterogeneity is to use econometric 
methods that are relatively agnostic about the form that heterogeneity takes, but that 
explicitly allow for it. This approach might be usefully termed the “random coefficients” 
approach. Instead of assuming that a risk aversion coefficient is a linear function of 
observables, one might assume that the coefficient is normally distributed across the sample. 
																																																								
6	We say so-called, since the term “unobserved” is not literally correct. We do observe that a certain set of 
observations were generated by one subject, and another set by other subjects, and this observation is used in 
all standard methods to correct for unobserved individual heterogeneity. A related issue is the interaction of 
models of “behavioral error” and unobserved heterogeneity, identified in Ballinger and Wilcox [1997].	
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In effect, each subject is assumed to have some true coefficient value, but these values are 
viewed by the analyst as being distributed across the sample in a way that can be 
characterized by a normal distribution. One then estimates hyper-parameters to reflect this 
population distribution.7 
 For example, if one assumes a normal distribution, one would estimate a mean 
(population) risk aversion coefficient and a standard deviation in the (population) risk 
aversion coefficient. Each hyper-parameter is estimated by a point estimate and a standard 
error.8 As the sample size gets larger, one would expect the estimated standard errors of the 
hyper-parameters to shrink, but one would not necessarily expect the standard deviation of the 
population parameter to shrink. This approach generalizes naturally to non-normal 
distributions for the population parameter, and to multivariate distributions where there are 
more than one population parameter. 
 There is no necessary tension between the second and third approaches.9 However, 
in practice one tends to see data evaluated using one or the other method.  
 
 B. Heterogeneity Across Time for the Same Individuals and Model 
 A closely related issue is the temporal stability, or temporal homogeneity, of risk 
preferences even when one uses the same elicitation procedure. It is possible to define 
																																																								
7	The terminology across the econometric literature is not standard, so the expression “hyper-parameter” can 
have other meanings. 
8 To be pedantic, there are then four estimates: the point estimate and standard error of the mean of the 
population parameter, and the point estimate and standard error of the standard deviation of the population 
parameter. 
9 Nor is there tension between the first approach and the latter two. It is likely that one cannot obtain reliable 
estimates for some models for each individual across a sample, due to errant behavior by those individuals, but 
that the subsequent analysis requires some estimate. In this case one could complement the individual-level 
estimate and standard error with a predicted point estimate and standard error from one of the latter two 
approaches. Providing the nature of this stochastic imputation is properly accounted for, the “complete case 
analysis” can then proceed over the entire sample. This problem is likely to become practically significant as 
small-scale experiments are increasingly used to augment the data collected in large-scale surveys in the field.	
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temporal stability of preferences in several different ways, reflecting alternative conceptual 
definitions and operational measures. Each definition has some validity for different 
inferential purposes. 
 Temporal stability of risk preferences can mean that subjects exhibit the same risk 
attitudes over time, or that their risk attitudes are a stable function of states of nature and 
opportunities that change over time. It is quite possible for risk preferences to be stable in 
either, both or neither of these senses, depending on the view one adopts regarding the role 
preference stability takes in the theory. The temporal stability of risk preferences is one 
component of a broader set of issues that relate to the state-dependent approach to utility 
analysis. This is a perfectly general approach, where the state of nature could be something 
as mundane as the weather or as fundamental as the individual’s mortality risk. Relevant 
states could also include the opportunities facing the individual, such as market prices and 
employment opportunities. Crucial to the approach, however, is the fact that all state 
realizations must be exogenous, or the model will not be identified and inferences about 
stability will be vacuous. For example, whether or not someone has chosen to be a mother 
would not typically be thought of as an exogenous state realization. 
 Problems arise, however, when one has to apply this approach empirically. Where 
does one draw the line in terms of the abstract “states of nature”?  Many alleged violations 
of EUT amount to claims that a person behaved as if they had one risk preference for one 
prospect context and another risk preference for a different prospect context. Implicit in the 
claim that these are violations of EUT is the presumption that the differences across the two 
prospect contexts were not contingent on some state of nature over which preferences could 
be different. Similarly, should we deem the preferences elicited with an open-ended auction 
procedure to be different from those elicited with a binary choice procedure, such as in the 
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much-cited preference reversals of Grether and Plott [1979], because of some violation of 
EUT or just some change in the state of nature? Of course, it is a slippery inferential slope 
that allows “free parameters” to explain any empirical puzzle by shifting preference 
attributions. Such efforts have to be guided by direct evidence from external sources, lest 
they become open-ended specification searches.10 
 These issues can be resolved by evaluation of longitudinal experimental data, where 
one is able to collect information on changes in observable states of nature over time. 
Examples of such studies include Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008] and 
Harrison and Lau [2014]. 
 
 C. Heterogeneity Across Models for the Same Individuals 
 Since different models of choice behavior imply different characterizations of risk 
attitudes, it is important that we make some determination about which of these models is to 
be adopted. One of the enduring contributions of experimental economics is that we now 
have a rich set of competing models of behavior in many settings, with EUT, RDU and CPT 
as the leading tools for representing choices under risk. Debates over the validity of these 
models have often been framed as “horse races,” with one theory being declared the winner 
on the basis of some statistical test in which the theory is represented as a latent process 
explaining the observed choice data. On this methodology, if one theory explains more of 
the data than another theory, it is adopted for application to new samples and the “loser” is 
discarded. The problem with this approach is that it does not recognize the possibility that 
several data-generating computational or other processes may coexist in a population. 
																																																								
10	Stigler and Becker [1977; p.76] note the nature of the impasse: “an explanation of economic phenomena that 
reaches a difference in tastes between people or times is the terminus of the argument: the problem is 
abandoned at this point to whoever studies and explains tastes (psychologists? anthropologists? phrenologists? 
sociobiologists?).”	
	 14	
Recognizing that possibility has direct implications for the characterization of the structure 
of human (and other animal) risk attitudes. 
 Ignoring the possibility of polymorphic risk preference structures can lead to 
erroneous conclusions about the domain of applicability of each theory, and is likely an 
important reason why the “horse races” pick different winners in different domains. For 
example, EUT is sometimes thought to govern choices involving financial risk, while failing 
to accurately characterize choices involving viscerally tempting sensations (Ainslie [1992]). 
For purely statistical reasons, if we conjecture that there are two or more latent population 
processes generating an observed sample, we can make more appropriate inferences if the 
data are not forced to fit a specification that assumes one data-generating process operating 
across the whole sample. 
 Heterogeneity in responses is well recognized as causing statistical problems in 
experimental and non-experimental data. Nevertheless, allowing for heterogeneity in 
responses through standard econometric methods, such as fixed or random effects, is not 
helpful when we want to identify which people behave according to which theory, and when. 
Heterogeneity can be partially recognized by collecting information on observable 
characteristics and controlling for them in the statistical analysis, as noted above. But this 
approach only recognizes heterogeneity within a given theory. This may be important for valid 
inferences about the ability of the theory to explain the data, but it does not allow for 
heterogeneous theories to co-exist in the same sample. 
 An approach to heterogeneity that reflects a more empiricist attitude, as proposed 
and illustrated by Harrison and Rutström [2005], is to construct a “wedding” of the theories 
by specifying and estimate a grand likelihood function that allows each theory to co-exist and 
have different weights. Such a likelihood function is referred to as a mixture model. The data 
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can then identify the relative degree of support in the data for each theory. The wedding is 
consummated by the maximum likelihood estimates converging on probabilities that 
apportion non-trivial weights to each theory. 
 Harrison’s and Rutström’s [2005] results are striking where risk preference theories 
are concerned: EUT and the direct ancestor theory of CPT (Kahneman and Tversky 1979])11 
share the stage, in the sense that each accounts for roughly 50% of the observed choices. 
Thus, to the extent that EUT and CPT imply different things about how one measures risk 
aversion, and the role of the utility function as against other constructs, assuming that the 
data are generated by one or the other theory can lead to erroneous conclusions. The fact 
that the mixture probability is estimated with some precision, and that one can reject the null 
hypothesis that it is either 0 or 1, also indicates that one cannot claim that the equal weight 
to these models is due to chance. 
 The main methodological lesson from this exercise is that one should not rush to 
declare one or other model as a winner in all settings.12 One would expect that the weight 
attached to EUT would vary across task domains, just as it can be shown to vary across 
observable socio-economic characteristics of individual DMs. In fact, one can represent the 
conjecture that a mixture model could also characterize the same individual, either 
synchronically or diachronically or both, as in the “dual criteria” models of the psychologist 
Lopes [1984] (e.g., see Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2014]). Alternatively, mixture 
models might characterize the same individual in different contexts: when there are lotteries 
defined over 1, 2 or 3 prospects, with rounded probabilities, versus lotteries defined over 4 
																																																								
11	The findings extend to the CPT model of Tversky and Kahneman [1992]. 
12 A concrete implication, considered at length in Harrison and Rutström [2005; §5], is that the rush to use non-
nested hypothesis tests is misplaced. If one reads the earlier literature on those tests it is immediately clear that 
they were viewed as poor, second-best alternatives to writing out a finite mixture model and estimating the 
weights that the data place on each latent process. The computational constraints that made them second-best 
decades ago no longer apply. 
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or more prizes with probabilities presented to the 3rd decimal place (e.g., Wilcox [1983] and 
Rubinstein [1988]). The implication for comparing “normal” states of human security threat 
responses systems with these same systems in “hyper-alarmed” states is obvious. 
 
 D. Heterogeneity Across Domains for the Same Individuals 
 Finally, one can imagine that preferences might vary for the same individual across 
decision domains. Someone might be slightly risk averse over financial decisions, but exhibit 
risk loving behavior with respect to health decisions involving risk. In some economic 
studies, when analysts assume the existence of “perfect markets” between commodities 
defined across these domains, such cross-domain heterogeneity is ruled out a priori. If the 
individual has a known market price at which health risks can be traded off against financial 
risks, then one can formally model this as if there is one composite wealth, effectively 
assuming that there is just one risk attitude to all components of that aggregate, composite 
wealth. In fact, this is generally an implausible assumption. When relaxed it leads to a 
venerable but neglected literature on multi-attribute and multivariate risk attitudes, reviewed 
by Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2011]. Consequently, social and behavioral 
scientists investigating risk responses who are unaware of this literature may rashly dismiss 
the relevance of economists’ models and deprive themselves of the tools with offer the best 
inferential power where precise estimation is concerned.  
 One can model interactions between these varieties of heterogeneity. Hence a DM 
might behave consistently with an EUT model over financial decisions and an RDU model 
over health decisions, and have state-dependent preferences in each domain (e.g., after 
marrying or having children). In investigating the human risk response system under the 
stress of politically motivated hyper-alarm, we should want to know whether people are 
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being rendered more risk averse, or more pessimistic about probabilities for more favorable 
outcomes, or are being triggered to manifest loss aversion. Let us now turn to directly 
consider these theoretical elements and their measurement. 
 
3. Heterogeneity in Risk Preference Structures 
Define the risk premium as the difference between the actuarial expected value (EV) 
of a risky prospect and the certain amount of money an individual would accept in exchange 
for giving it up (the “certainty equivalent,” or CE). Assume there is no bargaining process 
causing the individual to strategically mis-state this CE if asked for it directly or indirectly. 
Focus initially on risks that have objective probabilities attached to outcomes. The EV does 
not then depend on the DM’s attitudes to risk or subjective beliefs about these probabilities: 
it is just a matter of arithmetic. 
We consider three core models of decision-making under objective risk. All three 
agree on the risk premium. What they disagree about is how to explain it in terms of three 
(virtually or mechanistically implemented) data-generating processes.  
The core model is Expected Utility Theory (EUT), and posits that the risk premium 
is explained solely by an aversion to variability of earnings from a prospect. We say 
“variability” rather than just variance, because the DM can be averse to skewness or kurtosis.  
The second model is Rank-Dependent Utility (RDU), and further posits that DMs 
may be pessimistic or optimistic with respect to the probabilities of outcomes. RDU does 
not rule out aversion to variability of earnings, but augments it with an additional 
psychological process. Both EUT and RDU assume that individuals asset integrate, in the 
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sense that they net out framed losses from some endowment. This means that if the subject 
is told that there is a $100 house endowment, and that one lottery then involves a $15 gain 
and a $10 loss relative to that endowment with equal probability, the DM evaluates 
outcomes of $115 and $90.13  
The third model is Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), which adds an aversion to 
losses as a possible pathway to the risk premium, and also adds the assumption that gross 
gains and losses matter because individuals do not locally asset integrate and evaluate net 
gains or losses. Using the above example, the CPT DM would evaluate outcomes of +$15 
and -$10 if the $100 was the reference point for comparative valuation. The reference point 
is a “free parameter” in CPT, and must be identified on the basis of empirical investigation 
in any application or test of CPT.  
 
A. Expected Utility Theory 
Assume that utility of income is defined by a utility function U(x), where x is the 
lottery prize. Under EUT the probabilities for each outcome xj, p(xj), are those that are 
induced by the experimenter, so expected utility is simply the probability weighted utility of 
each outcome in each lottery. Once the utility function is estimated, it is a simple matter to 
evaluate the implications for risk aversion. The concept of risk aversion traditionally refers to 
“diminishing marginal utility,” which is driven by the curvature of the utility function, which 
is in turn given by the second derivative of the utility function. Although somewhat loose, 
																																																								
13	We call this “local asset integration” because it refers to endowments in the laboratory session. If the subject 
also integrates wealth that they have “outside” the lab than we refer to “global asset integration.”  	
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this can be viewed as characterizing individuals that are averse to mean-preserving increases 
in the variance of returns.14  
 
B. Rank-Dependent Utility 
The RDU model of Quiggin [1982] extends the EUT model by allowing for decision 
weights on risky choice outcomes. These decision weights reflect probability weights on 
objective probabilities. The decision weights are defined after ranking the prizes that occur 
within prospects, from largest to smallest. The largest prize receives a decision weight equal 
to the weighted probability for that prize: the decision weight reflects the probability weight 
of getting at least that prize. The decision weight on the second largest prize is the 
probability weight of getting at least that second largest prize, minus the decision weight of 
getting the highest prize, and so on similarly for other prizes. 
The Dual Theory (DT) specification of Yaari [1987] is the special case of the RDU 
model in which the utility function is assumed to be linear. Hence diminishing marginal 
utility can have no influence on the risk premium, and the only thing that can explain the risk 
premium is “probability pessimism,” that is, a representation of the decision weights of 






14	The third and fourth derivatives can similarly, and loosely, be viewed as characterizing attitudes under EUT 
towards skewness and kurtosis. The literature on “higher-order risk preferences” (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger 
[2006]; Ebert and Wlesen [2014]) develops these ideas, and the sense in which these statements can be made 
more precise.	
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C. Cumulative Prospect Theory 
The key innovation of the CPT model of Tversky and Kahneman [1992], in 
comparison to EUT and RDU, is to allow sign-dependent preferences, where risk attitudes 
depend on whether the agent is evaluating a gain or a loss relative to some reference point. 
The concept of loss aversion, based on sign-dependent preferences, has been formalized in 
different ways in the literature. It captures the general notion that “losses loom larger than 
gains” when evaluating risky prospects with gains and losses. 
Loss aversion is conventionally defined by what we call “utility loss aversion.” This 
arises when the absolute value of the utility decrement of a unit loss is bigger than the utility 
increment of a unit gain.15  
What if the decision weights for the gain domain differ from the probability 
weighting functions for the loss domain? There is nothing a priori in CPT to rule this out. 
Even if the basic utility functions for gains and losses are linear, and conventional utility loss 
aversion is absent, this could induce the same behavior as if there were utility loss aversion. 
This is called “probabilistic loss aversion” by Schmidt and Zank [2008, p.213]. Imagine that 
there is no probability weighting on the gain domain, so the decision weights are the 
objective probabilities, but that there is some probability weighting on the loss domain. Then 




15	To make a statement like this, we need to be able to compare utility changes in the gain domain and the loss 
domain for the same DM. This means that we cannot just have a utility scale that allows any order-preserving 
transformation: otherwise one could choose utility numbers that violated the hypothesis. In turn, this means 
that we have to be more restrictive than allowing positive affine transformations, and limit ourselves to 
defining utility on a ratio scale rather than an interval scale.	
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D. Estimating Risk Preference Structures in Empirical Choice Data 
We describe the analysis by which we determine whether an observed DM is better 
characterized as an EUT, an RDU, or a CPT agent. We then show, in tabular form, estimates 
we and co-authors have obtained of the highest likelihood mixtures of these modes of 
agency in various studied populations. These results constitute a current summary 
description of the emerging target for baseline specification of the structure of human risk 
preferences, as produced by processes that are presumed to include biological and cultural 
evolution, and social and individual learning.  
Assume that utility of income reflects constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), defined 
by 
 U(x) = x(1-r)/(1-r)  (1) 
where x is a lottery prize and r≠1 is a parameter to be estimated. Then r is the coefficient of 
CRRA for an EUT individual: r=0 corresponds to risk neutrality, r<0 to a risk loving 
attitude, and r>0 to risk aversion, as defined earlier. 
Let there be J possible outcomes in a lottery defined over objective probabilities. 
Under EUT the probabilities for each outcome xj, p(xj), are those induced by the 
experimenter, so expected utility (EU) is simply the probability weighted utility of each 
outcome in each lottery i: 
 EUi = ∑j=1,J [ p(xj) × U(xj) ].       (2) 
The original RDU model of Quiggin [1982] extends the EUT model by allowing for 
decision weights on lottery outcomes. The specification of the utility function is the same 
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parametric specification (1) considered for EUT.16 To calculate decision weights under RDU 
one replaces expected utility defined by (2) with RDU: 
 RDUi = ∑j=1,J [ ω(p(xj)) × U(xj) ] = ∑j=1,J [ ωj × U(xj) ]    (3) 
where 
 ωj = ω(pj + ... + pJ) - ω(pj+1 + ... + pJ)      (4a) 
for j=1,... , J-1, and 
 ωj = ω(pj)         (4b) 
for j=J, with the subscript j ranking outcomes from worst to best, and ω(p) is some 
probability weighting function. 
We consider three popular probability weighting functions. The first is the “power” 
probability weighting function considered by Quiggin [1982], with curvature parameter γ: 
  γ(p) = pγ         (5) 
So γ ≠1 is consistent with a deviation from the conventional EUT representation. Convexity 
of the probability weighting function, when γ>1, is said to reflect “pessimism” and generates, 
if one assumes, for simplicity, a “linear” utility function, a risk premium since ω(p) < p  for 
all p and hence the RDU expected value weighted by ω(p) instead of p has to be less than 
the EV weighted by p. 
																																																								
16	To ease complexity of notation we use the same parameter r because the context always make it clear if this 
refers to an EUT or RDU model.	
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The second probability weighting function is the “inverse-S” function popularized by 
Tversky and Kahneman [1992]: 
 ω(p) = pϒ / ( pg + (1-p) γ )1/Υ       (6) 
This function exhibits inverse-S probability weighting (optimism for small p, and pessimism 
for large p) for γ<1, and S-shaped probability weighting (pessimism for small p, and 
optimism for large p) for γ>1. 
The third probability weighting function is a general functional form proposed by 
Prelec [1998] that exhibits considerable flexibility. This function is 
 ω(p) = exp{-η(-ln φ)j},        (7) 
and is defined for 0<p≤1, η >0 and φ >0.  
[Table 1 about here] 
In the experiments compared in Table 1 evaluating EUT and RDU, subjects made K 
binary choices between lotteries defined in the gain frame, where K typically ranged between 
30 and 100. After all decisions were made one of the K choices was chosen at random to be 
played out in accordance with the choices of the subject. Under EUT this experimental 
payment protocol provides incentives for truthful binary choices.17 The batteries of lottery 
pairs used were carefully selected for the purpose of identifying whether any given subject 
behaves more consistently under EUT or under RDU.  
																																																								
17	Harrison and Swarthout [2014] discuss the evidence for this experimental payment protocol, particularly 
when drawing inferences about RDU models. Their findings just make our classifications of subjects as EUT 
or RDU more conservative with respect to EUT (i.e., we are more likely with this payment protocol to classify 
subjects as RDU than if the protocol had no effect).	
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To evaluate RDU preferences we estimate an RDU model for each individual. We 
consider the CRRA utility function (1) and one of three possible probability weighting 
functions defined earlier by (5), (6) and (7). For our purposes of classifying subjects as EUT 
or RDU it does not matter which of these probability weighting functions characterize 
behavior: the only issue here is at what statistical confidence level we can reject the EUT 
hypothesis that ω(p) = p. 
Perusal of Table 1 shows that both EUT and RDU preference structures are very 
common across a range of populations. These include subjects in the USA and in developing 
and poor countries. They include substantial portions of men and women, undergraduate 
students and adult subjects drawn from broad community samples, and subjects of varying 
levels of income, wealth, and literacy. Not shown in the table is the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of subjects in all of the samples were observed to be moderately risk 
averse. 
Table 1 shows observations of estimated proportions of CPT agents for a minority 
of our studies. One can only include CPT in a mixture model for data that included choices 
in which prospect contexts include outcomes framed by subjects as net losses, and where 
some prospects used a “mixed frame” in which some outcomes were gains and some 
outcomes were losses. This involves design and logistical complications in experiments that 
are not always worth paying, because in our experience the increment to mixture model 
estimation precision added by including CPT has typically been small as long as RDU is 
included in the model. This methodological judgment derived from experience should 
perhaps be put on hold, and re-evaluated, when researchers turn to a fundamentally new 
phenomenal target, such as the response of security-threat systems under hyper-alert stress. 
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Tversky and Kahneman [1992; p. 309] popularized the functional forms we often see 
for loss aversion, using a CRRA specification of utility: 
 U(m) = m1-α /(1-α) when m ≥ 0  (8a) 
 U(m) = -λ[(-m)1-β /(1-β)] when m < 0,  (8b) 
and where λ is the loss aversion parameter. Here we have the assumption that the degree of 
loss aversion for small unit changes is the same as the degree of loss aversion for large unit 
changes: the same λ applies locally to gains and losses of the same monetary magnitude 
around 0 as it does globally to any size gain or loss of the same magnitude. 
 We allow flexibility in the probability weighting for losses and gains with the power 
probability weighting function by using 
ω(p) = pω+ for m ≥ 0      (9a) 
 ω(p) = pω- for m < 0                                                                                      (9b) 
 
and where the p in question is the objective probability associated with that specific m. For 
the inverse-S function we use 
ω(p) = pϒ+ / ( pϒ+ + (1-p)ϒ+ )1/ϒ+ for m ≥ 0  (10a) 
 ω(p) = pϒ- / ( pϒ- + (1-p)ϒ- )1/ϒ- for m < 0.  (10b) 
 
For the Prelec function we use 
 ω(p) = exp{ -η+ (-ln p)φ+ }  (11a) 
 ω(p) = exp{ -η-  (-ln p)φ- }.  (11b) 
 
It is important to be explicit about these specifications of the probability weighting functions 
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across gain and loss frames, since it is a key, but neglected, component of CPT. 
 We do not define the three models in terms of specific parameters. There is a 
tradition that defines “the CPT model” by patterns of risk attitudes, such as the “fourfold 
pattern of risk aversion.” We do not want to constrain the model a priori in this manner, and 
in fact many of the alleged empirical regularities are simply false (e.g., Wilcox [2015]). We see 
no reason to reject a model because the empirical folklore claimed specific parameters and 
those parameter values ended up being false. Evolutionary psychologists should be alerted to 
this, since the majority of psychologists who have incorporated formal versions of prospect 
theory into their models have assumed a specifically parameterized form of CPT. In the 
research program to model the effects of hyper-activating threat signals, we recommend that 
this be avoided. 
 The final column of Table 1, applying to two of the samples, is of interest. It reflects 
use of a mixture model that combines the “aspiration” (A) model of a psychologist (Lopes 
[1995]) with a generalized RDU model. Lopes suggested a model focusing on a specific 
member of the RDU family of models, but we generalize. A is a dual-criteria decision model, 
like many psychological ones, including the original, pre-cumulative, version of prospect 
theory due to Kahneman and Tversky [1979], which also features in Table 1 as “OPT." In 
Lopes’s model, the decision weights in SP/A theory derive from a process by which the DM 
attends to both a prospect’s achievement of a minimum security level and lower-probability 
but especially attractive upside potential. The modeled inverted- S shape function reflects 
higher attention weighting of particularly bad outcomes, so as to take special care to avoid 
them, while simultaneously over-weighting the very best outcomes. In effect, a DM with this 
weighting function is biased in favor of security but attends to especially attractive prospects 
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as long as the security threat from doing so is below a threshold value. It will be noted that 
this model performs extremely powerfully in the mixture models in which it was included. In 
fact the best performing model of all reported by Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström 
[2014] mixes EUT and (RDU + A) as the “top” criterion, and then nests the RDU / A 
mixture at a second level of choice selection.  
 The column of Table 1 headed “DA” shows the unimpressive performance of a 
“disappointment aversion” model due to Gul [1979], according to which DMs evaluate 
prospects according to an augmented version of EUT, in which they also take into account 
the extent to which an outcome differs from the CE of the prospect. 
 
4. Heterogeneity in Subjective Beliefs About Probabilities 
The notion that subjective probabilities can be usefully viewed as prices at which one 
might trade has been a common one in statistics, and is associated with de Finetti 
[1937][1970] and Savage [1971]. It is also standardly assumed in the vast literature on 
gambling, particularly on the setting of odds by bookies and parimutual markets (Epstein 
[1977, p. 298ff.]). The central insight is that subjective probabilities of events are marginal 
rates of substitution between contingent claims, where the contingencies are events to which 
the probabilities refer. There are then myriad ways in which one can operationalize this 
notion of a marginal rate of substitution. 
 Scoring rules are procedures that convert a “report” by an individual into a lottery 
defined over the outcome of some event.  The formal link between scoring rules and 
optimizing decisions by agents is also familiar, particularly in Savage [1971]. A scoring rule is 
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simply a way of translating a reported probability or belief into some earnings based on the 
actual outcome. It is convenient to think about scoring rules for binary events, and then 
scoring rules for continuous events. An example of a binary event might be “A typical 
American male will live 70 or more years. True or false?” The corresponding continuous 
event would be “How long will the typical American male live?” 
 
 A. Scoring Rules for Binary Events 
 A scoring rule for binary events asks the subject to make some report θ, and then 
defines how an elicitor pays a subject depending on their report and the outcome of the 
event. This framework for eliciting subjective probabilities can be formally viewed from the 
perspective of a trading game between two agents: you give me a report, and I agree to pay 
you $X if one outcome occurs and $Y if the other outcome occurs. The scoring rule defines 
the terms of the exchange quantitatively, explaining how the elicitor converts the report 
from the subject into a lottery. We use the terminology “report” because we want to view 
this formally as a mechanism, and do not want to presume that the report is in fact the 
subjective probability π of the subject. In general, it is not. 
 The Quadratic Scoring Rule (QSR) for binary events was apparently first used in 
incentivized experiments by McKelvey and Page [1990], and is by far the most popular. In 
most early applications the subject was implicitly or explicitly assumed to be risk-neutral, and 
we return to this issue below.18 There are many other “proper” scoring rules in use. 
																																																								
18	McKelvey and Page [1990] augmented the scoring rule procedure with a “binary lottery” payment procedure 
to induce risk-neutrality. In theory the subject earns “points” in the scoring rule, which convert in a linear 
manner into an increased probability of winning some lottery defined over a high prize and a low prize. There 
is considerable controversy over the behavioral validity of this procedure, reviewed in Harrison, Martínez-
Correa and Swarthout [2013].	
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 The QSR can be defined in terms of two positive parameters, α and β, that 
determine a fixed reward the subject gets and a penalty for error, respectively. Assume that 
the possible outcomes are A or B, where B is the complement of A, that θ is the reported 
probability for A, and that Θ is the true binary-valued outcome for A. Hence Θ=1 if A 
occurs, and Θ=0 if it does not occur (and thus B occurs instead). The subject is paid S(θ|A 
occurs) = α - β(Θ-θ)2 = α - β(1-θ)2 if event A occurs and S(θ|B occurs) = α - β(Θ-θ)2 = α 
- β(0-θ)2 if B occurs. In effect, the score or payment penalizes the subject by the squared 
deviation of the report from the true binary-valued outcome, Θ, which is 1 and 0 
respectively for A and B occurring. An omniscient seer would obviously set θ= Θ. The fixed 
reward is a convenience to ensure that subjects are willing to play this trading game, and the 
penalty function defines the penalty from not being an omniscient seer. In the experiments 
reported in Andersen, Fountain, Harrison and Rutström [2014] α = β = $100, so subjects 
could earn up to $100 or as little as $0. If they reported 1 they earn $100 if event A occurs or 
$0 if event B occurs; if they reported ¾ they earn $93.75 or $43.75; and if they reported ½ 
they earn $75 no matter what event occurs. 
 It is intuitively obvious, and also well known in the literature (e.g., Winkler and 
Murphy [1970] and Kadane and Winkler [1988]), that risk attitudes will affect the incentive 
to report one’s subjective probability “truthfully” in the QSR.19 A sufficiently risk averse 
agent is drawn to a report of ½, and varying degrees of risk aversion will cause varying 
																																																								
19	There exist mechanisms that will elicit subjective probabilities without requiring that one correct for risk 
attitudes, such as the procedures proposed by Köszegi and Rabin [2008; p.199], Karni [2009], Grether [1992], 
Holt and Smith [2009], Offerman, Sonnemans, van de Kuilen and Wakker [2009] and Hao and Hauser [2012], 
discussed further below. The last four employ these mechanisms in an experimental evaluation. All of these 
elicitation procedures have some potential problems. The first is the poor incentive properties around the true 
subjective belief. This is particularly the case when using the Becker, DeGroot and Marschak [1964] procedures, 
where mis-reporting leads to very small expected lost earnings. The second is that explanations of these 
procedures are not easy for subjects to understand.	
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distortions in reports from subjective probabilities. If we knew the form of the (well-
behaved) utility function of the subjects, and their degree of risk aversion, we could infer 
back from any report what subjective probability they must have had. This is exactly what 
Andersen, Fountain, Harrison and Rutström [2014] illustrate, recognizing that one only ever 
has estimates of the true degree of risk aversion. 
 
 B. Scoring Rules for Continuous Events 
 The DM in this setting reports her subjective beliefs in a discrete version of a QSR 
for continuous distributions, developed by Matheson and Winkler [1976]. Partition the 
domain into K intervals, and denote as r k the report of the density in interval k = 1,…, K. 
Assume for the moment that the DM is risk neutral, makes decisions consistently with SEU, 
and that the full report consists of a series of reports for each interval, { r1, r2,…, rk ,…, r K } 
such that r k ≥ 0 ∀k and  ∑ i = 1,…, K (r i ) = 1. Figure 1 illustrates the case in which K = 10. 
 If k is the interval in which the true value lies, then the payoff score is from 
Matheson and Winkler [1976; p.1088, equation (6)]: 
 S = (2 × r k)  -  ∑ i = 1, …,K (r i )2       (12) 
The reward in the score is a doubling of the report allocated to the true interval, and a 
penalty that depends on how these reports are distributed across the K intervals. The subject 
is rewarded for accuracy, but if that accuracy misses the true interval the punishment is 
severe. The punishment includes all possible reports, including the correct one. Let reports 
consist of 100 tokens to be allocated across the intervals. 
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 To ensure complete generality, and avoid any DM facing losses, again allow some 
endowment, α, and scaling of the score, β. We then get the generalized scoring rule 
 α + β [ (2 × r k)  -  ∑ i =1, …,K (r i ) 2 ]  (13) 
where we initially assumed α=0 and β=1 in (12). We can assume α>0 and β≠0 to get the 
payoffs to any positive level and units we want. In our elicitation procedures K = 10, as 
shown in Figures 1 and 2. The QSR we use in the behavior reported later, and underlying 
the displays in Figures 1 and 2, uses α = β = 25. Hence the maximum payoff possible, if all 
tokens are allocated to one interval, is $50. 
[Place Figure 1 about here] 
[Place Figure 2 about here] 
 In our application each individual selects an allocation of 100 tokens by sliding a bar 
for each bin, with the “histogram” representation changing in real time. Only when 100 
tokens have been allocated can the allocation be submitted, and even then there is a need to 
actively confirm the choice. This design extends the binary QSR interface single-slider 
developed by Andersen, Fountain, Harrison and Rutström [2014], which allows the 
experimenter to use a specific QSR to generate the implied allocations without burdening 






 C. Controlling for Risk Attitudes 
 We do not know whether the subject whose subjective beliefs about probabilities we 
are estimating is risk neutral. Indeed, the weight of evidence from past laboratory and field 
experiments clearly suggests that subjects will be modestly risk averse over the prizes they 
face. One approach is to try to induce risk neutrality using binary lottery procedures, as 
reviewed in Harrison, Martínez-Correa, Swarthout and Ulm [2014][2015] and applied in 
Harrison and Phillips [2014]. Another approach is to estimate risk attitudes and consider the 
extent to which they distort reported beliefs. We favor the latter approach in general, since it 
puts less strain on the subject understanding the logic of the binary lottery procedure. 
 
 Subjective Probabilities over Binary Events 
 It is well-known that risk aversion can significantly affect inferences from 
applications of the QSR to eliciting subjective probabilities over binary events (Winkler and 
Murphy [1970], Kadane and Winkler [1988]). Andersen, Fountain, Harrison and Rutström 
[2014] demonstrate how one can estimate utility functions and/or probability weighting 
functions using choices over lotteries with objective probabilities, assume that the same 
functions apply to scoring rule responses, and estimate latent subjective probabilities. 
 
 Subjective Beliefs over Continuous Events 
 Harrison, Martínez-Correa, Swarthout and Ulm [2012] characterize the implications 
of the general case of a risk averse agent when facing the QSR and reporting subjective 
distributions over continuous events, and find, remarkably, that these concerns do not apply with 
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anything like the same force under Subjective Expected Utility (SEU). For empirically 
plausible levels of risk aversion, one can reliably elicit the most important features of the 
latent subjective belief distribution for an SEU agent without undertaking calibration for risk 
attitudes. Providing that our subjects exhibit the modest levels of risk aversion found 
universally in the lab and field settings for stakes of the levels typically used in economic 
experiments (e.g., Harrison and Rutström [2008]), and that we are willing to assume SEU for 
the individual, these results provide the basis for using the reported distributions as if they 
are the true, subjective belief distributions. 
 
 Recovering Subjective Belief Distributions 
 A maintained assumption in these comforting results is that the DM behaves 
consistently with SEU. Harrison and Ulm [2015] generalize these findings further, showing 
how one can exactly calibrate latent subjective belief distributions for individuals that behave 
consistently with EUT or RDU when faced with choices over objective lotteries. 
 
 Recovered Beliefs Are Conditional on the Assumed Model of Risk Preferences 
 Figure 3 illustrates the importance of determining the correct model of risk 
preferences, a theme that goes back to Savage [1971][1972]: one cannot recover subjective 
beliefs without making some assumptions about the underlying model of risk preferences. 
These are the elicited and recovered beliefs of one person about the fraction of deaths due 
to cancer that the Center for Disease Control attributes to smoking. This subject is a young, 
female smoker, so these are important beliefs for her health decisions. If we use a 1% 
significance level in testing for violation of EUT then we characterize her as an EUT DM, 
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and her recovered beliefs closely track the reported beliefs. However, if we use a 5% or 
higher significance level, then we characterize her as an RDU DM, and recover latent 
subjective beliefs that are much closer to the true facts. She underestimates the risk of 
smoking no matter how we characterize her risk preferences, but the misperception is clearly 
greater if we model her as an EUT DM. So from a qualitative perspective we do not need to 
know whether her risk preferences are EUT or RDU, but to ascertain the quantitative 
magnitude of her misperception we do need to correctly know those preferences. 
[Place Figure 3 about here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
 Human dispositions to choose under conditions of risk and uncertainty involve a 
number of structural elements that can be independently elicited and jointly estimated. We 
reviewed methods for estimating first-order risk preferences, risk preference structure (i.e., 
EUT or alternatives), and subjective beliefs about probabilities. Other elements, second-
order risk preferences, were mentioned but not reviewed. Modeling choice under uncertainty 
(or ambiguity) involves further methodological complications. We focused on observed 
heterogeneity, along multiple dimensions, in these aspects of risk response structure for two 
reasons. First, economists often model risk in ways that foreclose observation of 
heterogeneity. This can lead psychologists and other behavioral scientists to doubt that 
economists’ theoretical approach is sufficient empirically sensitive at a grain of analysis that 
engages with real behavior at the relevant level of abstraction. Second, in the specific context 
of studying evolved biases in human risk response, when psychologists have borrowed 
economists’ models for the sake of specification rigor, they have sometimes been led by the 
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imposition of horse race methods (which are one strategy for imposing homogeneity) into 
thinking that evolution favored a uniform bias, for example loss aversion. We presented 
evidence against this hypothesis, at least insofar as currently operative risky choice patterns 
are taken to be evidence for biases inherited from human ancestors. The target model for 
evolutionary modeling of the baseline risky choice structure, according to the evidence 
presented, is one in which optimization features prominently in data, but not more 
prominently than models according to which tail probabilities are weighted pessimistically in 
subjective expectations. Another explanatory target for evolutionary psychologists is the 
recurrent finding that most people are moderately risk averse. 
 Concerning the vulnerability of human risk response system to exploitation of 
dispositions to hyper-alarm suggested by Woody and Szechtman [2016], our findings enrich 
the range of available structural specifications of hypotheses. Exaggeration of loss aversion 
does not appear to be recommended as the first place to look, contrary to what might be 
gathered from popular accounts such as Ariely [2008]. One possibility is that risk aversion 
increases in domains of preference that scare-mongers emphasize. A more likely first suspect, 
we suggest, is distortions of probability weighting functions, again in specific domains. This 
suggestion raises intriguing further questions in advance of the research. Are people who are 
disposed to EUT-consistent choice in pre-alarmed conditions less prone to exploitation by 
scare-mongers than RDU choosers? Or, given the strong performance in two mixture 
models of Lopes’s dual criteria model, are some people vulnerable to having their reflective 
processes suppressed, leading to runaway dominance of processes that focus exclusively on 
security levels? As we have documented, experimental economists are equipped with a set of 
sharp investigative and analytical tools with which to help psychologists test mathematically 
well specified formulations of these and related hypotheses.
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Table	1:	Observed	proportions	of	EUT,	RDU,	and	CPT	DMs	based	on	lottery-choice	experiments	
     Number of… Percent Behaving Consistently with… 
Study Country Sample Treatment Econometrics Subjects Choices EUT DT RDU DA OPT CPT A 
Harrison and Rutström 
[2009] 
USA Undergraduates  Pooled mixture 
model 
158 9311 55%    45%   





Peasant farmers  Pooled mixture 
model 
531 4248 46%  54%     
Harrison and Ng [2016] USA Undergraduates  Individual 
estimation 
102 8160 49%  51%     
Harrison and Swarthout 
[2016] 
USA Undergraduates House money Individual 
estimation 





58 5800 7% 0% 55% 5%  33%  
MBA students House money Individual 
estimation 
94 9400 26% 0% 61% 0%  13%  
Harrison and Ulm [2016] USA Undergraduates  Individual 
estimation 
65 3250 33%  67%     
Harrison, Ng, Swarthout 
and Ulm [2016] 
USA Undergraduates  Individual 
estimation 
76 11020 60%  40%     
Harrison and Ross [2014] South 
Africa 
University faculty  Individual 
estimation 
193 9650 57%  43%     
Andersen, Harrison, Lau 
and Rutström [2010] 




125 870   7%    93% 
Andersen, Harrison, Lau 
and Rutström [2014] 
U.K. Game show 
contestants 
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